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CASE COMMENTS
statements raise the issue of whether the Court determined the
question solely on procedural grounds or whether they based their
decision on policy questions. If the former is true, the effect of
Sniadach will be far-reaching; however, if the latter is true, then
Sniadach will have a much more limited effect.
David Jeffrey Millstone
Insurance-Pickup Truck is not a Private
Passager Automobile
Robert L. Laraway, the insured, was killed while riding as a
passenger in a 1966 Chevrolet pickup truck. The vehicle was owned
by a Pennsylvania construction corporation which employed him as
a foreman. The accident took place while Laraway was going to
work on Monday, September 11, 1967. Plaintiff, as beneficiary of an
accident insurance policy, sought a recovery and the insurance
company disavowed liability. The Circuit Court of Monongalia
County, sitting in lieu of a jury, rendered a judgment of $12,000
in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appealed. Held, reversed and
remanded. The pickup truck was not a private passenger automo-
bile within the meaning of the clear and unambiguous words of
the insurance policy's coverage. Laraway v. Heart of America Life
Ins. Co., 167 S.E. 2d 749 (W. Va. 1969).
The Laraway case introduced an issue which, had not previous-
ly been considered by the West Virginia court. The problem cen-
tered around the interpretation of the policy coverage as applied to
the vehicle in which Laraway was riding, the 1966 Chevrolet pick-
up truck. On the face of the policy appeared the following language:
"THIS IS A LIMITED POLICY READ IT CAREFULLY."' The
restrictive language in the policy said that the policy covered
"bodily injuries to the insured resulting in his death while actually
riding in or driving 'any private passenger automobile."'2 The
policy then defined "the word 'automobile' and the words 'a private
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passenger automobile' as follows: 'As used in this policy, automo-
bile means a land vehicle of the type commonly and ordinarily
known and referred to as automobile, and a private passenger auto-
mobile means a private automobile of the private passenger design
designed primarily for transporting persons."'3
The court, in excluding Laraway from coverage, relied chief-
ly on the principle that the provisions of the policy were clear and
unambiguous and not subject to a more favorable construction for
the insured. The nexus of the problem was the interpretation of
the statement "a private passenger automobile means a private
automobile of the private passenger design designed primarily for
transporting persons."4 Essentially, the court ruled that these words
on their face disqualified Laraway from coverage because the pick-
up truck was not such a vehicle.
Apparently only one other court has been faced with the same
issue involving a pickup truck and identical policy language. In
English v. Old American Ins. Co.,5 the Missouri court reached a
similar result by means of entirely different reasoning. After a
thorough study of all the authorities the court in English said the
policy definition of "private passenger automobile" did not dispel
the ambiguity. The Missouri court made the further observation
that it was a futile task to fix "an immutable classification upon
such a versatile vehicle as a half ton pickup."0 The issue was ulti-
mately resolved by holding that the phrase "designed primarily for
transporting persons" should be interpreted from the standpoint of
the manufacturer. It was the primary purpose for which the vehicle
was manufactured that was controlling and not how the vehicle was




'426 S.W. 2d 33 (Mo. 1968). (emphasis added)
'Id. at 38.
'Id. at 39. The vehicle involved was a 1962 Chevrolet pickup truck. The
evidence supported the fact that apart from its occasional use in carrying gro-
ceries and in carrying a log, jack and chain in its bed, the vehicle was ex-
clusively used for the transportation of persons. Nevertheless, the plaintiff accept-
ed the court's guidelines and sought to prove that the principal purpose for
which the vehicle was manufactured was that of transporting persons. The
Regional Merchandising Manager of New Trucks for the Chevrolet Division of
General Motors testified in behalf of the plaintiff. However, his testimony ulti-
mately revealed the fact that the manufacturer classified and considered the
vehicle's principal purpose as that of transporting merchandise and goods.
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The problem confronted by the West Virginia and Missouri
courts was not a novel one. Other jurisdictions have had difficulty
in determining the status of pickup trucks in relation to the varied
language of accident insurance policies. Generally, the courts have
been called upon to decide whether the policy is broad enough to
include or narrow enough to exclude a plaintiff from coverage. It is
in this area of limiting the scope of the policy that the vehicle plays
a principal role. Specifically, the issue has been whether a pickup
truck is a private passenger automobile under the language of the
policy.
As an aid to interpretation, the courts have often relied upon
various rules of construction.8 Perhaps the most prominent prin-
ciple states that unambiguous policy language is to be given its plain
and ordinary meaning.9 In its application neither party is to be
favored 0 and the expressed intent governs.- Under this principle
a 1950 Studebaker pickup truck was found not to be a private
passenger type automobile.j2 A Louisiana court used the same prin-
ciple as a basis for excluding a plaintiff from coverage on the
grounds that the pickup truck was not a private automobile of the
exclusively pleasure type.'3 The Laraway decision then, can be
characterized as an amplification of this well settled principle of
law.1 4 However, this is not to say that this "settled principle" has
been applied with uniform consistency. The plain and ordinary
meaning of words in one jurisdiction may not be so clear in another.
'See generally Annot., 38 A.L.R. 2d 867 (1954).
See e.g., Adkins v. American Cas Co., 145 W. Va. 281, 114 S.E.2d 556 (1960).
"See e.g., Christopher v. United States Life Ins. Co., 145 W. Va. 707, 116 S.E.
2d 864 (1960).
'See e.g., Lewis v. Dils Motor Co., 148 W.Va. 515, 135 S.E.2d 597 (1964).
'La Fon v. Continental Gas. Co., 241 Mo. App. 802, 259 S.W. 2d 425 (1953).
The court said that in every case cited by the plaintiff a recovery was permitted
because of ambiguity within the policy. However, the court found that there
was no such ambiguity in the present policy. (emphasis added).
"Gray v. North American Co. for Life, Accident & Health Ins., 128 So. 2d
223 (La. App. 1961); accord, Marshall v. Washington Natl Ins. Co., 246 N.C. 447,
98 SE. 2d 345 (1957).
'Larway v. Heart of America Life Ins. Co., 167 S.E. 2d 749, 751 (W. Va.
1969). The court said, "rthat language of an insurance contract which is
clear and unambiguous cannot be construed or interpreted but must be applied
in accordance with the intent expressed therein."
1970]
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In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bidwell,1 5 the Tennessee court took judicial
knowledge of the fact that in that state a pickup truck was com-
monly used and regarded by many as a private passenger automo-
bile of the pleasure car type.
Another axiom receiving extensive application is that pertain-
ing to ambiguity. Briefly stated, a liberal construction of the policy
in favor of the insured is warranted if the language is unclear or am-
biguous.16 In Schilling v. Stockel,17 the Wisconsin court said that the
words used to define private passenger automobile were neither
clear nor readily understandable to the average person. According-
ly, a Studebaker pickup was held to be within the policy coverage.
In addition to those already mentioned, other factors have
been given weight in arriving at a final determination. Probably
foremost among them has been the manner in which the pickup
truck was used.'8 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bidwell-9 represents an out-
standing example of a court placing emphasis on this aspect of the
inquiry. The court said that the policy examined was silent as to
192 Tenn. 627, 629, 241 S.W. 2d 595, 596 (1951). The insured was on a
pleasure trip when she was accidently killed while riding in a half-ton pickup
truck. The court concluded that there was "affirmative evidence, if such evidence
is competent, that pickup trucks are commonly used in this State as a passenger
vehicle for pleasure purposes" and that "[t]his fact is so generally known that
this Court takes judicial knowledge of it."; accord, Detmer v. United Security
Ins. Co., 309 S.W. 2d 713, 715 (Mo. 1958). The court said "[i3t is generally
known that such half-ton pickups are adapted for and commonly used in part
as passenger cars."
"Green v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 139 W. Va. 475 80 S.E. 2d
424 (1954).
"26 Wis. 2d 525, 537, 133 N.W. 2d 335, 341 (1965). The court interpreted
the policy as defining a private passenger automobile as being either a station
wagon, a jeep type automobile or a private passenger automobile. The court
reasoned that the definition was neither enlightening nor free from ambiguity
because at least part of the definition left the court defining private passenger
automobile as a private passenger automobile. The court then said that from
"the evidence as to the size, construction, appearance, actual use and cus-
tomary use in the community, and comparable premium rates, . . . the jury
could draw the reasonable and permissible inference that the Studebaker pickup
was a passenger-type automobile." (emphasis added) Contra, Home Indem. Co.
v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 446 (D. Mont. 1968).
"E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Martin, 66 F. 2d 438 (9th Cir. 1933) (Ford Road-
ster pickup, used for both pleasure and business, held to be a private passenger
automobile (emphasis added); Pocino v. Sierra Neveda Life & Cas Co., 104 Cal.
App. 671, 286 P. 729 (1930) (manner in which the vehicle was used in addition
to its construction was relevant); Detmer v. United Security Inc. Co., 309 S.E.
2d 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (immediate and past use of the pickup truck plus
fact that such a vehicle was commonly used as a passenger automobile entitled
it to be called a private passenger automobile); Paetz v. London Guarantee &
Accident Co., 228 Mo. App. 564, 71 S.W. 2d 826 (1934) (Ford Runabout, used
[Vol. 72
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meaning and therefore concluded that "in determining the type
of an automobile within the meaning of an insurance policy the
general and common use to which a given automobile is put is a
fact that should be considered . . . ., Despite the fact that at
least one court has denied the relevance of such an issue,2' the Aetna
case2 seems to represent the predominant view.
Some courts have placed importance on the construction of
vehicle, while others have held that the licensing classification is
an overriding factor4 or at least a persuasive one.2 Finally, one
mainly as a family car, held to be an automobile and not a truck); (emphasis
added; Paltini v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 121 Neb. 447, 237 N.W. 392 (1931) (tour-
ing car converted into a tow car was not an automobile truck, emphasis added)
construction and use of the vehicle were noted Mutual Benefit Health and
Accident Ass'n v. Hudman 385 S.W. 2d 509 (Tex. 1964) (pickup truck was
designed and used for the dual purpose of transporting passengers and goods).
"D192 Tenn. 627, 241 S.W. 2d 595 (1951).
"Id. at 635, 241 S.W. 2d at 599.
'Spence v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 320 Ill. App. 149, 50 N.E. 2d 128
(1943). The plaintiff argued that the insured had used the Ford pickup truck for
carrying persons whom he picked up on the highway and at church. He also
stressed the fact that the insured used the vehicle for transportation to and
from work and that benches were sometimes placed in the rear to accommodate
persons. The evidence also showed that the insured hauled coal and other
materials in the pickup, but only for family purposes. Therefore, it was the
plaintiff's position that as to the insured, the pickup truck was a private passen-
ger type automobile of the exclusively pleasure type. However, the court was of
the opinion that this was not the proper yardstick. It was the court's contention
that if the plaintiff's construction were adopted an insured might prove his case
by calling a vehicle such as a tractor or tank a private passenger automobile as to
him. This idea was considered unsound.'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bidwell, 192 Tenn. 627, 241 S.W. 2d 595 (1943).22E.g., Fidelity & Cas Co. v. Martin, 66 F. 2d 438 (9th Cir. 1933) (evidence
showed that Ford Roadster pickup truck had the same motor, wheels and
chassis as a sedan); Gaumnitz v. Indemnity Ins. Ca., 2 Cal. App. 2d 134, 37 P. 2d
712 (1934) (court differentiated a truck from a pickup truck in that former
was designed to carry heavy inanimate loads while latter was constructed to
carry only light loads); Pocino v. Sierra Nevada Life a Gas Co., 104 Cal. App.
671, 286 P. 729 (1930) (use and construction of the vehicle were important fac-
tors). (emphasis added); Mattson v. Maryland cas Co., 100 Cal. App. 96, 279 P.
1045 (1929) (Ford Model T was deemed an automobile and not an automobile
truck). Aemphasis added); Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n v. Hudman,
385 S.W. 2d 509 (Tex. 1964) (Chevrolet Fleetside pickup truck was from
appearances, common knowledge, and the evidence a dual purpose automobile);
Johnson v. Maryland Cas Co. § § Wash. 2d 305, 155 P. 2d 806 (1945) (one and
one-half ton pickup truck with express body, truck motor and generally heavier
construction than passenger automobile was not a private passenger automobile).
2E.g., Spencer v. Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co., 320 Ill. App. 149, 50 N.E. 2d
128 (1943) (Illinois statute classified one type of vehicle as a passenger car and
designated others as being designed for transporting more than seven passengers
or for carrying freight); Dirst v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 232 Iowa 910, 5 N.W.2d
185 (1942) (Ford pickup truck registered as a Class A truck held not to be a
1970]
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court in applying the expressis unius rule, has said that an exclu-
sionary clause excepting certain vehicles from coverage necessarily
allowed all others to be included.
26
In conclusion, it should be mentioned that although the West
Virginia court in Laraway said that the policy was clear and unam-
biguous, it still noted as pertinent the evidence relating to the
pickup truck's use and construction. Will the court, if confronted
with a future case involving similar policy language as applied to
a pickup truck feel that such evidence is relevant? If the answer is
yes then the prospect for recovery is better, because a review of the
cases indicates that plaintiffs do stand a better chance of recovering
when emphasis is placed on the private nature and use of the
vehicle.
Craig R. McKay
Lotteries-Promotional Scheme Constituting a Lottery
Safeway Stores, Inc., operated ten retail grocery stores in Sno-
homish County, Washington. Each of the stores sponsored a
"Bonus Bingo" contest as part of its advertising activity. Winners
received cash awards. No purchase was necessary to obtain the
prize slips used in the game, but in order to obtain a sufficient num-
ber of prize slips to complete a winning card it was necessary to
visit the store. The contest was advertised extensively within the
store and in the general advertising of Safeway in the local news-
papers. Snohomish County sought a declaratory judgment on the
legality of the contest, and an injunction against continuance by
Safeway of the contest, alleging it constituted an illegal lottery. The
private passenger automobile of the pleasure car type); Paetz v. London Guar-
antee & Accident Co., 228 Mo. App. 564, 71 S.W. 2d 826 (1934) (vehicle was
licensed and registered as a Ford Runabout, but was used as a family car.)
"E.g., Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assoc. v. Hudman, 385 S.W. 2d
509, 513 (Tex. 1964). The Texas statute defined a passenger car as any motor
vehicle, excluding a motor cycle or a bus, that was "designed or used primarily
for the transportation of persons." The court did not consider the statute con-
clusive, because it was adopted in a different context, but its persuasive value
was accepted.
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bidwell, 192 Tenn. 627, 241 S.W. 2d 595 (1943).
[Vol. 72
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